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Fundamental R&D Spillovers and the Internationalization of a Firm’s
Research Activities

Abstract

A conceptual framework is proposed for analyzing how differences in national
R&D stocks can impact on a firm’s decision to internationalize its R&D activities. A
central finding is that the integration of product markets can generate an added
incentive to undertake R&D abroad. A three-stage analysis of a non-cooperative game is
proposed, which entails cost-reducing process innovation in an international model of
duopoly. Each firm’s technological efficiency depends not only on its investment in
applied R&D, but also on its absorption of domestic and foreign fundamental R&D, as
well as the extent to which the latter are substitutes or complements. In a first stage, a
firm’s absorption of foreign fundamental R&D can be impacted by a decision to localize
R&D activities abroad. The interrelation between this decision and initial production
costs is also explored.

JEL classification codes: F15, F23, O3
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I. Introduction
It has long been recognized that research and development, at the level of both
countries and firms, can play a critical role in explaining their economic performance as
reflected, for example, by trade and investment shares, as well as endogenous economic
growth. Increasing attention has also been given to the potential for R&D spillovers
impacting on diverse dimensions of national and international economic performance.
Branstetter (1998) and Mohnen (1999) have offered recent surveys of the latter
literature, while Griliches (1992), Nadiri (1993), and Mohnen (1996) have considered the
more general role of R&D externalities. Yet, the extent to which the localization of R&D
activities has become globalized remains a subject of relatively less attention for which
there has been little formal modeling.1 Indeed, the relative lack of attention to the
determinants of knowledge flows contrasts with the vast literature relating to the
international mobility of products, services and factors of production. For the most
part, existing investigations of the globalization of R&D activities have been confined to
empirical and policy analysis – often involving case studies and firm surveys. Certain of
these studies highlight the role that distinctive national innovative environments can
have in attracting R&D-related foreign direct investment. In particular, Florida (1997)
found that a key consideration accounting for the establishment of foreign-affiliated
R&D laboratories in the U.S was an objective to have access to scientific and technical

1

However, Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2002) have recently offered a formulation of the trade-offs that a
multinational enterprise faces when envisaging the decentralization to foreign subsidiaries of certain R&D
activities traditionally undertaken by the parent firm.
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human capital, while Granstrand (1999) emphasized the excellence of American
universities as a driving force attracting Japanese R&D.2
Clearly, if the internationalization of R&D activities enhances firms’
technological

competitiveness,

the

interrelation

performance is rendered inherently more complex.

between R&D and industrial
Traditionally, the literature on

multinational enterprises has highlighted how intangible assets due to distinctive
technological innovations in home countries can explain the “compensating advantage”
of corporations in foreign markets.3 Yet, to the extent that the localization of firms’
R&D activities becomes internationalized, there are apparent measurement issues. This
suggests potential methodological limitations in studies of R&D productivity and the
determinants of foreign direct investment, which have been largely reliant on national
R&D statistics.4

Furthermore, existing empirical analysis of international R&D

spillovers, such as those proposed by Coe and Helpman (1995), as well as by Coe,
Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997), has not made sufficiently explicit either the
microeconomic underpinnings of the analysis, nor the structural mechanisms by which
alternative sources of fundamental and applied R&D affect international economic
performance.

Presumably reduced form econometric estimates of technological

spillovers are sensitive to the underlying specifications for such structural mechanisms.

2

Representative other studies on the internationalization of R&D include the contributions by Brockhoff (1998),
Grandstrand (1999), Kuemerle (1997), Lefebvre and Madeuf (1999, 2001), Niosi (1999), Patel (1997), as well as
Serapio and Dalton (1999).
3
The extensive literature on multinational corporations is synthetically discussed by Caves (1996).
4
See, for example, the studies by Crepon, Duquet, and Mairesse (1998), Griliches (1992), Griliches and Mairesse
(1990), Mairesse (1994) and Mansfield (1994) relating to productivity and R&D. The survey of empirical
studies offered by Caves (1996) underscores the role of technological advantages in home countries as major
determinants of foreign direct investment.
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The objective of the present research is to offer a conceptual framework for
understanding the conditions under which a firm will be prompted to localize certain
R&D activities abroad. A central concern is with economic integration in goods markets
as a factor, which can explain the globalization of R&D. This issue of the interrelation
between product market integration and the internationalization of firms’ R&D
activities appears to have been largely neglected in existing analytical research. Indeed,
one characterization of the state of existing research is offered by Globerman (1997),
who suggested that it is “less clear how increased international economic integration will
affect incentives to decentralize R&D activities geographically, and the relevant
literature is rather confusing on this issue.” (p. 150)
As discussed in more detail in the next section, a variety of factors can account for
the globalization of both fundamental and applied R&D. With regard to the former,
there have been revolutionary decreases in international transactions costs resulting
from new information and other technologies. In this paper, however, the focus is on
globalization of R&D via corporations’ decisions to localize innovative activities abroad.
Both demand-side and supply-side factors can account for the increased pressures for
the globalization of firms’ R&D activities. The former include the need to adopt applied
R&D to the distinctive preferences of consumers in different markets.5

While

recognizing the eventual role of such demand-side factors, the focus in this research will
be on the role of a specific supply-side factor in influencing firms’ decisions to localize

5

Gaussens (2000) has offered an analysis of certain demand-side factors in driving firms to localize R&D
activities abroad, so as to attract customers and, thereby, maintain their international competitiveness.
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R&D abroad.6 In particular, the concern is with a need to acquire more advanced
and/or complementary forms of fundamental R&D, which are nationally distinctive.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. The next section starts by
reviewing a number of heuristic empirical issues relating to the characteristics of
technological innovation, along with its creation and diffusion. This then offers a point
of departure for a more formalized framework, which is proposed for analyzing issues of
how differences in national stocks of fundamental R&D can impact on the international
location of a firm’s R&D activities. The proposed analysis entails a three-stage analysis
of a strategic game involving a duopoly model of cost-reducing process innovation. A
firm’s technological efficiency is understood to depend not only on its investment in
applied R&D, but also on its absorption of domestic and foreign fundamental R&D. In
this paper’s third section an analysis of a more specific formulation of the model leads to
a series of central analytic propositions regarding the conditions under which a firm will
localize its R&D activities abroad.

More specifically, the analysis explores the

interrelation between the decision to internationalize R&D, the degree of international
market segmentation, and firms’ relative initial competitive positions in terms of their
production costs.

The central findings are shown to be robust to alternative

specifications regarding whether national stocks of fundamental R&D are substitutes or
complements. In a concluding section the principal contributions of this research are
summarized, while a number of conceivable extensions of the analysis are also identified.

6

The distinction made here between demand and supply-side factors is analogous to that suggested by
Kuemmerle (1997). In particular, he identified two primary objectives for classifying new R&D sites abroad:
“home-base-augmenting sites” and “home-base-exploiting sites”. He contended that the former were designed
“to tap knowledge from competitors and universities around the globe,” whereas the latter were aimed “to support
manufacturing facilities in foreign countries or to adapt standard products to the demand there” (p. 62).
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II. General Analytic Framework
A. Introduction
The point of departure for our analysis is a certain number of salient heuristic
observations regarding the nature of R&D. These motivate the principal modeling
assumptions that will be subsequently invoked.

First, it can be noted that both

fundamental and applied R&D have been historically characterized by a high degree of
concentration and locational specificity in firms’ countries of origin.

Second, the

globalization of firms’ R&D activities appears, in general, to have developed much more
slowly than has been the case for other activities, such as those related to production and
marketing. Taken together, these observations point to a potential national specificity of
R&D. Nonetheless, it needs to be recognized that the extent to which R&D has assumed
global dimensions depends on the specific categories of innovative activity. Notably, it is
potentially important to distinguish between fundamental and applied R&D, as well as
between product and process innovation.
Government sponsored R&D, which can entail universities, public research
institutes, and joint ventures between public institutions and industry, is undoubtedly a
principal source of fundamental R&D. There are marked international disparities in
both the levels and nature of government sponsored R&D. To the extent that these
distinctive characteristics generate a diffusion of knowledge, which assumes
geographical dimensions, they can be viewed as giving rise to national stocks of
fundamental R&D. Nonetheless, such stocks may have varying degrees of comparability

7

across countries. When such national stocks of fundamental R&D entail characteristics,
which are substitutes, certain countries may assume technologically dominant positions.
Fundamental R&D can be considered as constituting a form of international
semi-public good, whereby certain foreign firms may be excluded from fully benefiting
from technological spillover effects generated from other countries’ stocks.

In

particular, the transfer of fundamental R&D from a country’s public sector to firms
involves inherent access and transaction costs, which may be termed “learning” costs.
Hence, it can be contended that optimal absorption of fundamental R&D by the private
sector is enhanced by geographic proximity to national public-sector sources of
fundamental R&D and involves private sector investment costs.7

Alternatively,

fundamental R&D, arising in a given country, can be considered to generate positive
knowledge externalities, which spillover to the private sector both nationally and
internationally. It is a reasonable presumption that such spillover effects are heightened
by firms localizing R&D activities (labs) in a given source country.8

Indeed, the

acquisition of fundamental R&D can be regarded as a necessary condition defining the
capacity of firms to create new products, processes and services.

Thus, applied R&D

may be understood to entail the conversion at the firm level of basic knowledge into
process and product improvement. In sum, at an initial level of simplification, firms can
7

The process of transferring fundamental R&D can be impacted by government technology policies, which aim
at promoting its diffusion to the private sector. A clear example was the US government’s transfer of internet
technology, which had arisen from research sponsored by the Department of Defense.
8
National and international R&D spillovers can arise through the dissemination of fundamental knowledge in the
form of scientific presentations and publications. Such knowledge may be diffused asymmetrically across
countries due to differences in educational and research environments, as well as governments’ willingness to
share proprietary knowledge internationally. In addition, fundamental R&D spillovers undoubtedly capture
certain aspects of human capital markets for scientists and engineers. In particular, they can arise through
different degrees of labor market mobility, as well as through national disparities in the quality of scientific
training. Together these considerations suggest a national specificity of fundamental knowledge.

8

be viewed as principally undertaking two distinct R&D tasks: absorbing fundamental
R&D and investment in applied R&D for their commercial use.9 10
The foregoing considerations highlight the inherent complexities of modeling the
internationalization of firms’ R&D activities. Our analysis proposes an initial modeling
framework that highlights certain key aspects of the R&D globalization process. As
such, the analysis entails simplifying assumptions, while only considering certain
dimensions of the inherently complex overall process corresponding to the
internationalization of R&D. In particular, while recognizing that the extent to which
R&D stocks in different countries are either complements or substitutes is critical to
defining firms’ strategic international location decisions, the focus here will be on a
scenario where stocks of fundamental R&D are substitutes. Similarly, while remarking
the potential role that applied R&D spillovers between firms may contribute to
explaining international industrial performance, the concern will be with international
spillovers of fundamental R&D. Their interrelation with applied spillovers is left for
subsequent investigation.11

9

In fact, certain corporations also undertake path-breaking fundamental research. However, such basic
innovations may be either a necessary for undertaking more applied R&D, or a byproduct of research, rather than
a principal objective.
10
As intangible assets, absorbed levels of fundamental R&D and investment in applied R&D can be transferred,
to varying degrees, within firms - both nationally and internationally. However, there are potentially high
transaction costs and potential risks associated with transferring technologies between firms.
11

Other supply-side rationale for localizing R&D abroad include the need to internalize positive externalities
from applied R&D spillovers, competitive advantages gained by access to lower-paid, but
nonetheless highly skilled researchers, as well as industrial restructuring linked to market integration.

9

B. Characterization of the Innovation Processes
A duopoly model of international technological competition in cost-reducing
process innovation is proposed, where reference will be made to a domestic and foreign
country, and an asterisks is used to distinguish variables related to the latter. It is
hypothesized that there is a representative firm in each country, where the domestic and
foreign firms are designated, respectively, by the subscripts i and j.
There are two forms of R&D activity - fundamental and applied. Government
and university sponsored R&D is understood to be the principal source of fundamental
knowledge creation and to generate national R&D stocks. Firms can be viewed as
principally undertaking two distinct R&D tasks.

These consist of absorbing

fundamental R&D and, then, investing in applied R&D.12

The latter entails the

conversion by firms of fundamental R&D into process innovations.
The two countries’ fundamental R&D stocks, which are taken to be exogenously
given and are denoted by X and X*, are potentially distinctive in terms of their levels
and composition. In light of their geographical separation and an assumption that firms
must invest in order to absorb fundamental knowledge, these national R&D stocks have
certain features of international semi-public goods. More specifically, the proposed
analysis distinguishes between alternative scenarios in which the two countries’
fundamental knowledge stocks are either substitutes or complements. If the two stocks

12

There may be firm-specific allocative decisions regarding both the extent of absorption of fundamental
knowledge from public sector sources and investment in fundamental knowledge creation. As a result, firms’
fundamental R&D stocks could differ across firms, sectors, and countries. Consequently, there is the potential for
fundamental R&D spillover effects across firms with different degrees of locational specificity depending on the
importance of cluster effects at regional, national and international levels. Nonetheless, our focus will be on a
paradigm where it is the public sector, which is the principal source of differences in national R&D stocks.
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are substitutes, but one is larger than the other, there will be a technological gap
between the two countries.
Each firm has access to an overall fundamental technology base, which is an
amalgam of the national R&D stock in its own country and international spillovers of
fundamental knowledge. It is postulated that there are two key decisions by either firm,
which determine its overall resources of fundamental knowledge. The first of these is
whether the firm is willing to locate its R&D activities abroad, thereby enabling it to
internalize higher international spillovers of fundamental knowledge.

The second

concerns how much it is willing to invest in absorbing the available national and foreign
fundamental knowledge stocks.
More specifically, when the two countries’ R&D stocks are substitutes, a
representative (domestic) firm’s potential fundamental knowledge base is given by:13
x i = max [X, X + O ( X* - X)]

where O[0 , 1]

Note that O corresponds to the fundamental R&D spillover parameter in the case of the
domestic firm.

For expositional simplicity, it will be assumed for this case of

substitutability that the fundamental knowledge stock in the foreign country is higher
than that in the domestic country, and that the localization decision by the domestic firm
is the only one envisaged. Alternatively, in the case of complementary R&D stocks, the
potential technological bases for the domestic and foreign firms are given by:
x i = X + O X*

where O[0 , 1]

x j = O* X + X*

where O*[0 , 1]

13

In order to economize notation, analogous equations for the two firms will only be presented for the domestic
one.

11

Note that unlike the case of substitutability it is now not necessary to make any
hypothesis regarding the relative values of the R&D stocks, X and X*.
Note that the value of the positive spillover parameter, O, depends on whether
that firm localizes part of its R&D activities abroad.

In particular, the spillover

parameter equals O0 , if the firm does not locate R&D labs in the foreign country.
However, if it does undertake R&D abroad it has a easier access to an expanded
fundamental knowledge base, which is captured by a higher value for the spillover
parameter, such that O1 > O0 . For expositional clarity, x

i

0

and x i1, are used to

distinguish, respectively, the fundamental knowledge base of a firm before, xi [O0], and
after, xi [O1], it has established R&D activities abroad.
A firm’s actual capacity to mobilize fundamental knowledge, which is denoted by
zi , is impacted by several factors. First, this innovative capacity depends on the firm’s
fundamental knowledge base, which as discussed, is generated both nationally and
through international R&D spillovers of fundamental R&D.

Second, a firm’s

acquisition of fundamental R&D depends on its expenditures, designated as J i , which
aim at absorbing that available R&D stock.

Third, a firm’s success in acquiring

fundamental knowledge is determined by the actual absorption process.14

Taken

together, these three factors result in the following function determining a firm’s actual,
fundamental knowledge capacity:
z i = T (J i) x i

The functional form, T(J i ), capturing the process by which a firm absorbs fundamental knowledge, can have
a country specificity. This corresponds in part to the efficacy of the structure of university-industry linkages and
to government policies designed at promoting the transfer of basic R&D to industry.

14

12

Tc > 0 and

Decreasing returns are assumed, so that

T s < 0. The foregoing

specification also captures the semi-public nature of fundamental R&D, since
transferring it from the public sectors to firms involves inherent access and transaction
costs that may be viewed as “learning” or, alternatively, absorption costs.
A firm’s overall investment in R&D, U

i

, entails a combination of both the

foregoing flow expenditures on absorbing fundamental knowledge stocks and its applied
(flow) R&D budget, β i , such that:
Ui = Ji+ βi
Its effective technological efficiency, e

, is understood to depend on its overall

i

expenditures on R&D, their allocation between fundamental and applied research, as
well as the prevailing technology transforming these investments into reductions in cost.
The functional relation capturing this technology process is assumed to be common to
both countries, so that:
e i = ) [ z i , β i ] = ) [T(J i ) x i , β i ]
This function is assumed to be increasing and concave in the two arguments, z and β .
Note that this formulation offers a view of a firm’s overall international technological
efficiency in which R&D is an intangible asset which, while specific to each firm, can be
used on a worldwide basis within a given corporate structure.

Implicitly, there is an

optimization issue concerning the internal allocation of a firm’s expenditures between
domestic and foreign R&D sites. However, as a simplification, the analysis abstracts
from such issues, since otherwise solutions are quite intractable.

Nonetheless, the

proposed model highlights the role that a firm’s decision to localize its R&D activities

13

abroad can have by generating a higher propensity to absorb fundamental knowledge
and, thereby, a higher productivity of investments in applied research and development.
Efficient management of technological resources requires that a firm optimally
allocate its overall expenditures between fundamental R&D absorption and the
associated applied transformation of R&D into process innovations. For a given value of
technological efficiency, ê, this corresponds to the following minimization problem:
Min

Ui
with respect to J i , β i
subject to

) [T(J i ) x i , β i ] = ê i
This yields the following efficient R&D expenditure function:15
r i = r (e i , x i )

where

Thus, more R&D expenditures, r

∂ri
∂r
≥ 0 and i ≤ 0
∂ei
∂xi
i

, are necessary in order to achieve increased

technological efficiency, e i , while access to a larger base of fundamental R&D, x i ,
dampens the need for a firm’s overall R&D expenditures. As a consequence, there is an
apparent tradeoff between sunk costs linked to increased absorption capacity, due to

15

This function can be regarded as yielding “effective levels” of process R&D, given that a firm’s applied R&D
decisions are positively impacted by national public support for fundamental R&D. An equivalent production
function for effective technological efficiency, after cost minimization, could be characterized as having the
following general representative form:

ei = ei (ri , xi )
where

∂ei
∂ei
∂ 2ei
≥0,
≥ 0 , and
≥0 .
∂ri
∂xi
∂ri ∂xi

14

localizing R&D abroad, and a firm’s overall flow expenditures on R&D. Consistent with
the concavity hypothesis characterizing the effective technological efficiency function, e i
= ) [ z i , β i ] , the following second-order conditions are taken to apply for the efficient
R&D expenditure function:
∂ 2 ri
∂ 2 ri
∂ 2 ri
≥ 0,
≥ 0 and
≤0
∂ei2
∂xi2
∂ei ∂xi
In addition, for tractability it will also be assumed that:
∂ 3 ri
≤0
∂ei2 ∂xi
In sum, a firm’s overall R&D effort is viewed, in the current paradigm, as
comprising two key elements:

i.

the absorption of fundamental R&D, and ii. its

conversion into applied process innovations. Together, these entail the conversion of
fundamental R&D breakthroughs into reductions in variable costs of production, such
that for the representative firm (i), with an ouput level of qi , the following cost function
applies:
ci (qi , ei)

∂ci
∂ci
∂ 2 ci
≥ 0,
≤ 0 , and
≤0
where
∂qi
∂ei
∂q i ∂ei
Note that increased technological efficiency reduces the marginal cost of production.

C. The Basic Framework of International Technological Competition

15

The proposed analysis of international duopolistic competition in process
innovation entails sequential decisions, which can be treated as three distinct stages in a
non-cooperative game:
1. international localization decision in order to acquire fundamental R&D from
a technologically dominant country;
2.

R&D decisions by competing international duopolists, which entail both

overall levels of R&D expenditure and their allocation between the absorption of
fundamental R&D and its conversion, via applied R&D, to process innovation;
and finally,
3. product-market competition between two firms.
As in the research of Spencer and Brander (1983), a standard metholodogy of backward
induction is used to analyze the determinants of such international technological
competition.

However, unlike existing research, the proposed analysis admits the

additional possibility of firm’ initially localizing their R&D activities abroad in order to
absorb fundamental R&D from abroad.
More specifically, in the final stage the duopolists will determine their output
levels, qi and qj , in light of their relative technological competitiveness and demand
conditions in the two markets. The general form of the two firms’ objective functions is
given by:
3 i = Ri (qi , qj ) - ci (qi , ei) - ri (ei , xi)
3 j = Rj (qi , qj ) - cj (qj , ej) - rj (ej , xj)
The revenue functions, Ri and Rj, depend on the demand characteristics in the two
national markets, as well as on the extent of market segmentation.

16

Standard

assumptions regarding the form of demand functions will be made, while the national
markets are understood to be either fully or partially integrated internationally. In the
former case only a single overall demand function needs to be specified, whereas in the
latter scenario two distinct national demand functions are identified, which can be
eventually served by firms from both countries. The extent of international market
VHJPHQWDWLRQLVWKHQFDSWXUHGE\DSDUDPHWHU ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVWKHDGGLWLRQDOFRVWV
of exporting, rather than selling in the home market.16

Under Cournot-Nash

assumptions, the outcome of output competition in this final stage will be reduced form
solutions of the general form:
qi* = qi (ei , ej )
qj* = qj (ei , ej )
In the intermediate stage, the competing international duopolists simultaneously
determine their overall levels of effective technological efficiency, e i and e j , under Nash
assumptions, while efficiently allocating these R&D budgets between absorbing
fundamental knowledge stocks and undertaking applied cost innovations.17

These

investment and allocative decisions are undertaken while anticipating the associated
implications for their relative cost competitiveness in the final stage of output
competition. These effective technological efficiency decisions are in turn dependent on
the firms’ access to fundamental R&D stocks at home and abroad, which are potentially
16

Although national markets are often segmented by asymmetric trade and other costs, a simplifying assumption
of uniform export costs between the two national markets is made.

17

Since there is a dualism between levels of technological efficiency and corporate R&D expenditures,
ananalytically equivalent formulation is in terms of overall levels of ri and rj . Again, the latter entail
expenditures on both absorbing fundamental R&D and on its conversion, through applied R&D, to process
innovation.

17

impacted by eventual decisions in the first period to localize R&D activities in the
foreign country. The generic form for the associated reduced form solutions is given by:
ei* = ei (xi , xj )
ej* = ej (xi , xj )
In the first stage, differences between countries in their stocks of fundamental
R&D are understood to potentially generate an incentive for firms to localize R&D
activities abroad in order to obtain access to, and thereby absorb, fundamental R&D in
the foreign country. Both cases of substitutability and complementarity in the two
countries’ R&D stocks will be considered. In the first scenario of substitutability, the
foreign country is understood to be in a technologically dominant position, so that X* >
X . In a second scenario, where the fundamental R&D stock of the foreign country is
complementary to that available in a firm’s home country, the analysis will be limited to
a situation where only the international localization decision of the domestic firm is
considered and there is no strategic locational response by its foreign competitor. Thus,
the considerably more complex framework of a full game-theoretic analysis at this first
stage is left for further research.
There are apparent market access costs, along with associated learning costs,
entailed by localizing abroad in order to absorb foreign fundamental R&D. When only
unidirectional localization decisions are considered, so that the analysis relates to entry
into the foreign country, the sunk costs of localizing R&D activities abroad are captured,
for the representative domestic firm i , by an exogenous variable, Si . The decision to
localize R&D activities abroad will depend on whether the anticipated gain in profits,
resulting from access to an expanded fundamental knowledge base and the associated

18

increase in the firm’s technological efficiency, are higher than the sunk costs of setting
up a R&D lab abroad. This leads to the following critical inequality condition:
'3 i = 3 i ( x i1, xj) - 3 i ( x i0 , xj) > Si
As previously noted, the change in the value for the endogenous spillover parameter, O ,
plays a key role in impacting the potential gains from internationalizing a firm’s R&D
activities. Indeed, the potential change in a firm’s operating profit, resulting from its
localizing its R&D activities abroad, is at the center of much of the subsequent analysis.
Nonetheless, such a change in a firm’s operating profits, '3 i , is potentially impacted
by not only changes in the spillover parameters, O0 and O1 , but also both absolute and
relative changes in the stocks of fundamental knowledge in either country, X and X*. 18

III. Model Analysis and Determination of Central Analytic Propositions
A. Further Model Specifications
In order to undertake a more detailed analysis of the model, linearity
assumptions are made for both the demand and cost functions.

In particular, the

demand function, when the national markets are fully integrated, is given by:
Q=a-p
When there is market segmentation, the domestic and foreign demand functions are,
respectively:
Q1 = a1 - b1 p1
Q2 = a2 - b2 p2
18

An effect of the information technologies has undoubtedly been to facilitate the diffusion of fundamental and
applied knowledge. Within the proposed framework of substitutable R&D stocks, this could be interpreted as a
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Note that the sum of the slopes, b1 + b2 , equals one, which is numeraire used for the
slope of the global demand function. It will also be assumed that the price sensitivity of
demand in the two markets is not too different. More specifically, that the following
inequality conditions apply:
½  b1 / b2  2
The linear cost functions for the firms reflect the reduction of costs resulting from
increases in their levels of effective technological efficiency:
ci (qi , ei) = (ci0 - ei ) qi
International market segmentation is then understood to arise from the additional costs,
of selling qi* to a foreign market, instead of at home. These impact directly on an
exporting firm’s cost function, such that:
ci (qi*, ei) = (ci0 - ei + G ) qi*
For such a case of market segmentation, it will be demonstrated in Annex I that the
expression for a firm’s profit at the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to that
which would be obtained with a global demand function, except that the associated value
of the intercept, aic , is lower than in the fully integrated scenario. In particular, it is
shown that when the domestic exporter, faces additional trade costs of G , that:
ai c = a + G b i - 2 G b j
Note that the foregoing restriction on the price sensitivity of demand in the two markets
is a necessary condition for aic < a .

narrowing of the technological gap, X* - X. For a scenario of complementary, the globalization of technological
know-how may have resulted in an expanded set of distinctive national R&D stocks.
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B. General Characterization of the Duopoly Equilibrium

A detailed analysis of the three stages of international duopolistic competition is
essential in order to establish the cental propositions of this research. Using backward
induction, we start by characterizing the final stage of product market competition,
where given their degree of technological competitiveness, each firm simultaneously
determines its output and sales, qi , under Cournot-Nash assumptions.
In light of earlier specifications, the profit of firm i then corresponds to:
3i = ( p – ci ) qi – ri = Mi – ri
For notational simplicity, the symbol Mi is used to identify a firm’s revenues net of
variable costs, but not including the fixed costs, ri , of a firm’s R&D expenditures. The
latter are determined by the values of ei and xi , which are taken as given in this final
stage of output competition.
In light of the linear demand function, Q = a – p , it is straightward to ascertain
the following characteristics of the Cournot – Nash equilibrium:
qi = 1/3 [a – 2 ci + cj ]
and
Mi = 1/ 9 [a – 2 ci + cj ] 2
Turning now to the second stage, the R&D decisions of the two firms, ei and ej , or
equivalently ri and rj , can be analyzed. In light of the linear cost functions, ci = ci0– ei
and cj = cj0– ej , the following variable is first defined:
Di = a – 2 ci0 + cj0 .
Consequently, the third stage equilibrium production and profit of firm i are:
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qi = 1/3 [Di + 2 ei – ej ]
and
3i = = Mi – ri = 1/ 9 [Di + 2 ei – ej] 2 – ri ( ei , xi )

Non-cooperative equilibrium for competition between the two firms in their effective
technological efficiencies, ei and ej , is specified, for firm i , by the condition :
∂M i 4
∂r
= (α i + 2ei − e j ) = i
∂ei
9
∂ei

Similarly, the reaction function for firm j corresponds to the relation:
∂r j
4
(α j + 2e j − ei ) =
9
∂e j

These two equations yield the equilibrium values of ei and ej , as functions of each of the
firms’ potential knowledge bases, xi and xj .
The corresponding second-order conditions are:
ki =

9 ∂ 2 ri
−2≥0
4 ∂ei 2

Actually, a more restrictive assumption is invoked. Specifically, it is supposed that the
parameters of function ri are such that ki > 1 . As will be seen later, this guarantees that
the optimal level of each firm’s technological efficiency, ei , is an increasing function of
its potential knowledge base, xi .
A consequence of equilibrium in the second stage is that the profit of firm i is a
function of both firms’ knowledge bases, xi and xj . In the initial stage, firm i will decide
whether to localize abroad or not. Such foreign localization entails an increase in the
domestic firm’s operating profit, 3i . In a scenario of substitutable R&D stocks, this is
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due to x increasing from xi0 = X + O0 (X* - X) to xi1 = X + O1 ( X* - X). With
complementary stocks, the corresponding values of x are: xi0 = X + O0 X* and xi1 = X +
O1 X* .

C. Central Analytic Results for Fully Integrated Markets

In this sub-section a series of propositions will be demonstrated on the basis of a
more detailed analysis of the three stages of the model. First, we consider how changes
in the level of firm’s fundamental knowledge stock impact on the equilibrium values of
the duopolists’ levels of technological efficiency, production and profits. In particular, a
further analysis of the second stage yields the following:

Lemma 1:
An increase in that firm’s fundamental knowledge base, x i , due to an increase in
either the level of its home stock of fundamental knowledge, X, or in the international
spillover parameter,

O, will, ceteris paribus, increase its effective technological

efficiency, ei , quantity of sales, qi, and its profits, 3

i

. In contrast, the comparable

values for its competitor, e j , qj , and 3 j decrease.

The demonstrations of these results are based on an analysis of the effects of marginal
variation of the domestic firm’ knowledge base, dxi , assuming that its competitor’s
knowledge base, xj , remains constant. Differentiation of the equilibrium conditions
characterizing each firm’s reaction function in the second stage yields:
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ki dei + de j = −

9 ∂ 2 ri
dxi
4 ∂ei ∂xi

dei + k j de j = 0
This can be simplified to:
dei =

 9 ∂ 2 ri 
−
dxi
ki k j − 1  4 ∂ei ∂xi 

de j =

− 1  9 ∂ 2 ri 
−
dxi
ki k j − 1  4 ∂ei ∂xi 

kj

In light of earlier assumptions that the second-order cross derivatives of the function ri
are negative, it is easy to see that:

de j
dq j
dei
dqi 1  dei dej 
 ≥ 0 ,
≥0 ,
≤0 ,
≤0
=  2
−
dxi
dxi
dxi
dxi 3  dxi dxi 
The foregoing effects are illustrated by the changes in the reaction functions, Ri and Rj ,
and associated Nash equilibria, N and N1, as shown in Figure 1.

24

Figure 1
The Competitive Gain in Effective Technological Efficiency Resulting
from an Increase in the Domestic Firm’s Knowledge Base
ej

Ri’

N

N’

Rj

Ri

ei
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Furthermore, it follows that:
 ∂q ∂e ∂q ∂e j  ∂ri ∂ei ∂ri
∂Π i
∂q ∂e j ∂ri
−
= 2q i  i i + i
−
= 2qi i
−


∂xi
∂e j ∂xi ∂xi
 ∂ei ∂xi ∂e j ∂xi  ∂ei ∂xi ∂xi
∂e j
∂Π i
∂q i
∂r
≥ 0 , since
≤ 0,
≤ 0, i ≤ 0
∂xi
∂e j
∂xi
∂xi

Similarly, it can be readily shown that an increase in the domestic firm’s fundamental
knowledge base decreases the profitability of its foreign competitor:
 ∂q j ∂ei ∂q j ∂e j  ∂r j ∂e j
∂q j ∂e j
−
= 2q j 
+
= 2q j
≤0
 ∂e ∂x ∂e ∂x  ∂e ∂x
∂xi
e
x
∂
∂
i
i
j
i
j
i
j
i



∂Π j

Because of the model’s basic symmetry, it is also the case that:
∂Π i
≤0
∂x j
Consequently, the domestic firm’s profits, 3i , is an increasing function of xi and a
decreasing function of xj .
The analysis will now focus on the first stage when the domestic firm decides
whether to localize its R&D activities abroad. As already discussed, the associated
critical condition applies:

' 3 i = 3 i ( x i1 , x j) - 3 i ( x i0 , x j) > Si
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A consequence of Lemma 1 is that, a larger incremental spillover effect, O

1

- O

0

,

generated by localizing R&D activities abroad, will generate heightened net profits, i.e. d
' 3i > 0 . It is apparent that such a gain in profits can also be generated by a reduction
of the sunk costs of setting up R&D activities abroad, Si .

Based on Lemma 1 it is possible to establish two key propositions, which relate to
how changes in the domestic firm’s profits depend on its national fundamental R&D
stock, X, for the alternative scenarios of substitutability and complementarity between
this domestic stock and the foreign one.

Proposition 1:
Let us consider a scenario where international stocks of fundamental R&D are
substitutes and a firm comes from a country, which is a technological follower.
The impact on a firm’s profits from its localizing R&D activities abroad, ' 3i , as
a result of an increase in its national fundamental R&D stock, X, is potentially
ambiguous. Notably, d ' 3i / d X depends on initial value of the fundamental R&D
spillover parameter before R&D activities are localized abroad,

O

0

, and on the

associated gain in the international spillover parameter, O 1 - O 0 . For sufficiently high
values of O 1 , the gains from setting up R&D activities abroad, Π i , will, ceteris paribus,
decrease and tend to zero when there is convergence between the domestic and foreign
fundamental knowledge stocks, i.e. X o X*.
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Consequently, for any given value for the sunk costs of setting up R&D activities
abroad, Si , there exists a critical value of the national fundamental R&D stock, X ,
beyond which the firm will not localize its R&D activities abroad. This critical value
depends positively on the incremental spillover effects, O 1 - O 0 , resulting from setting up
R&D operations abroad.
Alternatively, it is apparent that there always exists a sufficiently large sunk cost
value, Si , such that the firm will not set up R&D activities abroad.

The demonstration of the foregoing proposition, which is rather straightforward,
is provided in Appendix I.
The incremental spillover effects, O 1 - O 0 , can be interpreted as representing the
differential return to acquiring tacit knowledge, which results from setting up R&D
activities abroad.

On the one hand, the substantial reduction in international

transactions costs, due to advances in information technologies, along with other factors
contributing to economic globalization, may have facilitated the international diffusion
of fundamental knowledge.

In the proposed model this can be interpreted, ceteris

paribus, as an increase in the initial spillover parameter O

0

.

On the other hand, the

heightened pace of technological change may be reflected by larger differentials in
countries’ stocks of fundamental knowledge, X* - X. Such an idea is undoubtedly
reflected in policy debates regarding the “digital divide”. An apparent implication of
Proposition 1 is that such offsetting effects, associated with economic globalization, may
have ambiguous implications on the rationale for localizing R&D abroad.
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We now examine how changes in the fundamental R&D stock impact on a firm’s
decision to localize R&D abroad for the case of complementary stocks in the two
countries. It should be noted that an increase in a country’s fundamental knowledge
stock now entails simultaneous increases in the knowledge bases of both the domestic
and foreign firms.

Proposition 2:
Let us consider a scenario where international stocks of fundamental R&D are
complements.
The impact on a firm’s profits from its localizing R&D activities abroad, ' 3i , as
a result of an increase in its national fundamental R&D stock, X, is again potentially
ambiguous. However, given certain technical assumptions on the second derivatives of
profit function in relation to a firm’s fundamental knowledge base, x

i

, it can be

demonstrated that ' 3i is an increasing function of X. Therefore, for any given value
for the sunk costs of setting up R&D activities abroad, Si , there exists a critical value of
the national fundamental R&D stock, X , under which the firm will not localize its R&D
activities abroad.

Appendix II provides the demonstration of this second proposition. Note that
both Propositions 1 and 2 point to a critical value of a country’s R&D stock, X , which
demarcates sub-sets of values of X for which a firm will either undertake R&D activities
abroad, or not do so.

However, as suggested by Figures 2a,b, the underlying
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mechanisms are quite different in the alternative scenarios of R&D substitutability and
complementarity. More specifically, the curves corresponding to the incremental change
in profits,' 3i , are, respectively, decreasing and increasing functions of the national
R&D stock, X.

In the former case of substitutability, the additional technological

advantage arising from locating abroad clearly declines as the two countries’ R&D
stocks converge. Under complementarity, there are two offsetting effects on the home
country’s relative technological competitiveness. While the direct impact of an increase
in that country’s R&D stock is to enhance its fundamental knowledge base, x i , there is
also an indirect effect, due to an associated technological spillover to the foreign country.
The latter results in an increased value of x j . The technical assumptions underlying
Proposition 2 ensure that the direct effect increasingly dominates the indirect one, so
that the associated incremental profit function in Figure 2b is upward sloping.
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Figures 2a,b
A Comparison of Conditions for Localizing R&D Activities Abroad under
Alternative Scenarios Regarding the Relation between the National Stocks

a) Substitutability
∆Πi

S

Foreign localization of
R&D

X

X*

X

b) Complementarity

∆Πi

S

X

X
Foreign localization of R&D
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D. The R&D Locational Effects of Variations in Demand and of Changes in Intial
Production Costs

In this sub-section, the impact of changes in initial demand and production
conditions on a firm’s propensity to localize R&D activities abroad will be characterized.
The formal analysis starts by considering, for given levels of the fundamental knowledge
bases x i and x j , the effects of variations in a representative variable, z, which impacts
on the equilibrium values of the two firms’ levels of effective technological efficiency e i
and ej . Such variations generate a change in the profit of the representative firm i. The
following lemma summarizes the principal results:

Lemma 2:
If

d Π i ( xi , x j )
dz

is an increasing (decreasing) function of x i , a rise (fall) in the value

of z modifies the threshold for the critical value of a country’s R&D stock, X , such that
the representative firm is more inclined to localize R&D activities abroad.

The demonstration of the foregoing result starts with the Taylor expansion for
the derivative of the incremental effect on profits due to a change in z:
1
0
d∆Π i dΠ i ( xi , x j ) dΠ i ( xi , x j )
d  ∂Π i ( x, x j ) 
=
−
= ( xi1 − xi0 ) 

dz 
∂xi
dz
dz
dz
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with x ∈ [xi0, xi1 ].
If

d  ∂Π i ( x, x j )  ∂  dΠ i ( x, x j ) 

=

 ≥ 0 then, '3i is increasing with z . Thus, when z
dz 
∂xi
dz

 ∂xi 

increases, the curve representing the evolution of '3i , as a function of X, moves
upward. Consequently, the threshold value a country’s R&D stock, X , moves to the
right (left) for the case of substitutable (complementary) R&D stocks, as shown in Figure
2a (2b).

The specific variables which are understood here to correspond to z are the
demand parameter a and the initial marginal production costs ci0 and cj0 . In Appendix
III it is demonstrated that under some specific assumptions

dΠ
dΠ
dΠ i
, − 0i and 0i are
da
dc j
dci

increasing functions of x i . This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 3:
The initial demand conditions, represented by the parameter a, as well as the
marginal costs of production for the domestic and foreign firm, ci0 and cj0, play critical
roles in determining whether a firm will localize R&D activities abroad.
For both scenarios of substitutable or complementary international stocks of
fundamental R&D, either an increase in demand, a fall in the initial marginal
production cost of firm i , or a rise in the initial marginal production cost of firm j
widens the range of values of the national fundamental R&D stock, X, for which the
representative firm i will localize its R&D activities abroad.
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In other words, when the domestic firm is relatively more competitive in terms of its
initial marginal costs of production, or demand conditions are more favorable, the
representative firm has a greater incentive to set up R&D in the foreign country. The
foregoing analysis is illustrated in Figure 3a,b by the upward movement of the change in
profit function, 'i , for an increased value of the parameter a relative to an value of a’.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that there are different adjustment mechanisms, depending
on whether the national stocks of R&D are either substitutes or complements. As shown
in Figure 3a, for a given level of sunk costs, S, and under the substitutability assumption,
heightened demand generates a higher threshold value of X, X , beyond which the firm
will not localize abroad. Alternatively, the impact of expanded demand costs is to
increase the critical values of sunk costs which warrant internationalizing R&D
activities – from S to S’.

Figure 3b illustrates the alternative scenario of

complementarity in the national stocks of fundamental R&D. Since an increase in
demand again generates an upward shift in the incremental profit function, the
threshold value of X, below which the domestic firm will not localize its activities
abroad, decreases with expanded demand. The effect of such increased demand on the
critical values of sunk costs is analogous to that under substitutability.
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Figures 3a,b
The Impact of Increased Demand on the Incentive to Undertake R&D
Activities Abroad for Alternative Scenarios Regarding the National R&D
Stocks
a) Substitutability
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The explanation for the findings, summarized in Proposition 3, is again that,
ceteris paribus, reductions in a firm’s domestic marginal production costs, as well as
increases in the marginal costs of its foreign competitor, induce a greater incentive for
the domestic firm to produce. With such a larger production base, there is a higher
return from increases in the firm’s technological knowledge base. In this regard, our
analysis highlights the associated rationale for internationalizing a firm’s R&D
activities, in order to absorb more fundamental R&D from abroad and reduce marginal
production costs.

E. Reduced Product Market Segmentation and the International Location of R&D

In this subsection the focus is on a central issue of how changes in the extent of
international market segmentation impact on the incentive for R&D activities to become
more globalized.

A central proposition characterizes the interrelation between the

impact of such reductions in trade costs and a firm’s incentive to localize R&D activities
abroad for both scenarios of substitutability and complementary between national and
foreign stocks of fundamental R&D. More specifically, the analysis focuses on the
implications of reducing international trade costs, which is captured in the analysis by
changes in a parameter, G. This represents the additional costs of a firm’s exporting,
rather than selling in the home market.

37

In Appendix IV it is shown that, when markets are segmented, the variable cost
margin for the representative firm i is similar to that with unified markets, except that
the demand parameter a must be replaced by a new coefficient, ai’ . This is defined by
the equation ai’ = ai + a j − δβ i , where β i = 2b j − bi .

Consequently, the equations

characterizing the equilibrium values for e i and e j are similar to those obtained in subsection IIIB, describing the general characterization of the duopoly equilibrium.
However, the expressions for Di andDj will be replaced by new parameters, which are
represented by α i’ and α ’j , where the following formulas apply: α i’ = ai’ − 2ci0 + c 0j and

α ’j = a ’j − 2c 0j + ci0 . It can be seen that heightened (reduced) market integration, as
reflected by a lower (higher) value for the trade cost parameter, G, results in higher
(lower) values for the demand parameters, ai’ , a ’j and also for α i’ and α ’j .

More

precisely, the variation in the degree of market segmentation dδ entails the following
i
dα i’ dα j
relation:
=
= − dδ .
βi
βj

It is shown in Appendix III that a decrease in trade costs induces firm i to seek
higher levels of technological efficiency, d e i / d G < 0 if the following condition is met:
k j β i − β j > 0 . In that case the marginal variation of the representative firm’s profit

resulting from a decrease of the trade costs is positive and an increasing function of x i .
The foregoing reasoning leads to a central finding in this research.
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Proposition 4:
Let us consider a scenario where two national markets are segmented due to
trade costs, G > 0 , of serving markets abroad, instead of at home.
If the demand conditions in the two countries are such that k j β i − β j > 0 , the
range of X values, for which a firm will localize R&D abroad, increases as trade costs
are reduced. However, the directional effects of these range changes in X differ for the
alternative scenarios of substitutability and complementarity in the national stocks of
fundamental R&D.
In particular, when foreign demand is at least as sensitive to price changes as in
the domestic country, so that b j ≥ bi and β j ≤ β i , the above inequality condition is
automatically satisfied, so that trade liberalization always generates a higher propensity
to localize R&D activities abroad. This follows from the assumption that k j ≥ 1 .

Thus, a central finding, which is conveyed in Proposition 4 and the foregoing
discussion, is that the probability of undertaking R&D in the foreign country is higher
with the increased integration of markets.

The basic intuition relates to how an

expanded potential market creates an added profit incentive to improve a firm’s
technological competitiveness. A key insight is that the heightened profit associated with
expanded foreign demand is itself an increasing function of a firm’s technological
efficiency, which, in turn, depends on its technological base. Ceteris paribus, the latter is
enhanced through the increased absorption of foreign fundamental R&D by localizing
R&D activities abroad. Alternatively, undertaking R&D activities abroad engenders
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sunk costs of access to a distinctive foreign technological environment. Following the
integration of product markets, there are associated economies of scale, due to the
spreading of such costs across a larger number of consumers. It can be noted that the
foregoing intuition offers an insight regarding the interpretation of the condition
relating demand in the two markets, specifically, k j β i − β j > 0 . Specifically, if foreign
demand is relatively more price sensitive, then this inequality is necessarily satisfied, and
increased trade liberalization will be associated with a higher opportunity cost of not
localizing R&D activities abroad, since the domestic firm can thereby gain a competitive
advantage abroad, which is enhanced for higher values of β j .

In sum, reductions of a firm’s trade costs or domestic marginal production costs,
as well as increases in overall demand or in the marginal costs of its foreign competitor,
induce, ceteris paribus, a greater incentive for the domestic firm to produce. With such a
larger production base, there is a higher return from increases in the firm’s
technological knowledge base. In this regard, our analysis highlights the associated
rationale for internationalizing a firm’s R&D activities, in order to absorb more
fundamental R&D from abroad and reduce marginal production costs.

IV.

Conclusion

An apparent lacuna in existing empirical and policy investigations of the
interrelation between firms’ research and development activities and their international
industrial performance is the lack of an adequate analytical perspective for
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understanding the factors leading to the globalization of R&D. Indeed, most research
relating to the internationalization of R&D has entailed policy and empirical studies,
which rely heavily on case studies, questionnaire surveys, and/or national data sources.
The central contribution of the current research is to offer a conceptual framework for
understanding factors relating to the interrelation between product market integration
and the incentive firms have to localize R&D abroad. The analysis has highlighted how
distinctive national R&D environments, as represented by national stocks of
fundamental knowledge, can impact on the interrelated decisions of firms as to how
much they should invest in absorbing fundamental R&D, undertaking applied R&D, as
well as where such activities should be located.
Promising directions for further investigation include the extension of the
analysis of complementary national R&D stocks to consider a more complex gametheoretic setting. Ongoing investigation of scenarios, where firms from more than one
country can localize their R&D activities abroad, suggests a number of Nash
equilibria.19

Another avenue for further inquiry concerns the impact of increased

oligopolistic competition, or other industrial structures, on the extent to which R&D
activities become globalized.
The possibility of applied R&D spillovers between firms, which may have varying
degrees of locational specificity, is another apparent direction for research.
Furthermore, the effects of applied spillovers are undoubtedly interrelated with the
extent of fundamental R&D spillovers, as well as processes whereby firms transform

19

In such an extended framework, certain outcomes are characterized by a form of Prisoners’ Dilemma where ex
ante decisions to localize abroad turn out to be unprofitable ex post, so that there is excessive globalization of
R&D activities.
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fundamental knowledge into process innovations.20

Ultimately, such research can

contribute to the literature on multinational corporations by identifying the role of
R&D, in relation to other determinants of production costs, for determining firms’
international locational decisions. In this regard, it should be noted that models of
foreign direct investment have often emphasized R&D as an intangible asset, which can
yield compensating advantages in foreign markets. In contrast, a general thrust of the
present research is to underscore how the nature of a firm’s R&D performance may be
impacted by the decision to localize abroad.
The paradigm proposed in this paper can offer a basis for understanding how
government support for fundamental R&D can impact on the evolution of countries’
international competitiveness and technological innovativeness of their firms.

In

particular, the analysis of national R&D stocks could also consider welfare implications
of alternative government technological, educational and industrial policies. Such an
extension might thereby offer an explanation for divergent levels and paths of such
stocks, as well as to different rates of national investment in the creation, and in the
absorption, of fundamental knowledge.21
A possible limitation of the existing analysis is that it does not consider
endogenous industrial structures, which could be altered by the globalization of R&D
activities. Owen and Ulph (2002) have offered a general framework for analyzing how
20

In terms of the analysis proposed in this paper, one approach for modeling applied spillover effects, which are
not locationally specific, is to include symmetric additive terms in the effective technological efficiency
functions. Within the context of our model, including such applied spillover effects potentially impacts on the
second stage of the proposed strategic game, thereby influencing the conditions which determine whether the
domestic firm undertakes R&D activities abroad.
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the welfare consequences of different degrees of international economic integration can
be determined by configurations of sunk, and other, costs. Analogous development of
the model proposed here could, for example, offer a basis for examining how the
rationale for research joint ventures (RJVs) might depend on locational factors
reflecting distinctive national R&D environments. Finally, as already emphasized, a
conceptual framework for factors accounting for the globalization of R&D is a critical
prerequisite for undertaking empirical analysis of national and international R&D
spillovers, along with their relation to global industrial performance. A key insight of
this research is that the productivity of private sector investments in R&D is conditioned
by firms’ capacity to absorb both domestic and foreign spillovers from fundamental
R&D. Thus, empirical applications of the proposed analysis also appear as a pressing
research priority.
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Appendix I
After localizing abroad, the incremental operating profit of firm i is given by:22

∆Πi = Πi ( xi1 , xj ) - Πi ( xi0 , xj )
where

xi1 = X + λi1 ( X* - X ) , xi0 = X + λi0 ( X* - X ),

(λi ,λi ) ∈
0

1

[0,1] , λi1 > λi0
2

Derivation of the foregoing with respect to X yields the following two equivalent expressions:

∂∆i = (1 − λ1) ∂Πi (xi1, x j) − (1 − λ0) ∂Πi (xi0, x j)
∂X
∂xi
∂xi
or

[

]

∂∆i = (1 − λ1) ∂Πi (xi1, x j) − ∂Πi (xi0, x j) − (λ1 − λ0) ∂Πi (xi0, x j)
∂X
∂xi
∂xi
∂xi
Using a Taylor expansion, the term in brackets in the foregoing expression, can be written as:

∂Π i 1
∂Π i 0
∂ 2Π i
∂ 2Π i
( xi , x j ) −
( xi , x j ) = ( xi1 − xi0 )
(
x
,
x
)
=
(
λ
−
λ
)(
X
*
−
X
)
( xi , x j )
1
0
i
j
∂xi
∂xi
∂xi2
∂xi2
with

[

]

xi ∈ xi0 , xi1 .

Following substitution, this leads to:
2
∂∆i = (λ1 − λ0) (1 − λ1)(X * −X) ∂ Πi (xi , x j) − ∂Π i (xi0, x j) 


∂X
∂xi2
∂xi

It has already been demonstrated that

∂Π i
( xi , x j ) ≥ 0 . It will now be assumed that 3i is convex in xi,
∂xi

∂ 2Π i
so that
( xi , x j ) ≥ 0 . It follows that for O1near to 1 and/or X near to X*, the first term of the
∂xi2
expression in the brackets will be small and the derivative of 'i will be negative. However, if O1 is small
and X sufficiently small in relation to X*, the derivative may become positive. In the latter case, when X
increases, the incremental profit of firm 1, 'i , will reach a maximum before decreasing.
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It should be remembered that the condition warranting localization abroad is given by:
'i = 3i ( x i1, xj) - 3i ( x i0 , xj) > Si
It has been shown that the incremental profit of firm 1 can initially be an increasing, and then
subsequently a decreasing function of the fundamental knowledge stock, X. For such a case, there are at
least some values of sunk costs, Si , such that there will be lower and upper bounds to the knowledge stock,

X ’ < X < X , beyond which localization abroad will not occur. Note that if the home knowledge stock is
very low, the incremental profit generated by foreign localization may also be very low, since the domestic
firm has too much of a competitive disadvantage to compete viably even when setting up R&D operations
in the foreign country. Hence, localization abroad will not take place.

22

For notational simplicity the symbol ∆i is used to indicate changes in the ith firm’s profits.
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Appendix II
In the case of complementarity between the domestic and foreign R&D stocks, the domestic firm’s
profit function is given by:
Πi = Πi ( xi , xj )

where now

[0,1]

xi = X + λi X* and xj = X* + λj X

(λ i , λ j ) ∈

It has already been shown that:

∂Π i
∂Π i
≥ 0,
≤ 0 . The following additional hypotheses will now be
∂xi
∂xi

2

made:

∂ 2Π i
∂ 2Π i
∂ 2Π i ∂ 2Π i
≥ 0,
≤ 0 , and
+
≥0
∂xi ∂x j
∂xi ∂x j
∂xi2
∂xi2
Note that the last of the foregoing three inequalities guarantees that the absolute value of the second-order
cross derivative is smaller than the second-order own effect.
The incremental profit generated by localizing R&D abroad is:
∆Πi = Πi ( xi1 , xj ) - Πi ( xi0 , xj ) = ∆Πi ( X, X*, λi0, λi1 , λj )

where xi1 = X + λi1 X* , xi0 = X + λi0 X*
It can now be demonstrated that, given X*, '3i is an increasing function of X :

∂∆Π i =  ∂Π i(xi1, x j ) ∂xi + ∂Π i(xi1, x j ) ∂x j  −  ∂Π i(xi0, x j ) ∂xi + ∂Π i(xi0, x j ) ∂x j 

∂X
∂xi
∂X
∂x j
∂X  
∂xi
∂X
∂x j
∂X 

= Φi(xi1, x j ) − Φi(xi0, x j)
where

(

)

Φ i xi , x j =

∂Π i ( x i , x j )
∂x i

+ λj

∂Π i ( x i , x j )
∂x j

.

∂Φ i ∂ 2 Π i
∂ 2Π i
=
+ λj
Thus, it follows that:
. Since 0 ≤ λ j ≤ 1 , the assumptions regarding the
∂xi
∂xi ∂x j
∂xi2
second derivatives of the profit function imply that

∂Φ i
≥ 0 , and hence ∂∆Πi ≥ 0 .
∂X
∂xi
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Appendix III

A. The Effects of Changes in Demand and Production Costs for a Unified Market
The concern here is with the incidence of marginal variations of parameters a,
the second stage equilibrium values of research efforts and firm i ’s profit.
By differentiating equilibrium conditions, one has:

ci0

and

c0j , upon

∂ 2 ri
4
(dα i + 2dei − de j ) = 2 dei
9
∂ei
∂ 2rj
4
(dα j − dei + 2de j ) = 2 de j
9
∂e j
or equivalently,

ki dei + de j = dαi
dei + k j de j = dα j
From this result, it follows that:

(ki k j − 1)dei = k j dαi − dα j
(ki k j − 1)de j = ki dα j − dαi

The derivative of firm i ‘s profit with regard to Di is given by:

dΠi = 2qi
dαi
∂qi
∂qi de j  

= 2qi
+
 +  2qi
 ∂αi ∂e j dαi  

dqi
− ∂ri dei
dαi ∂ei dαi
∂qi
∂qi 1 de j 
− ∂ri  dei = 2qi
−

∂αi ∂ei  dαi
 ∂αi 3 dαi 

The variations in firm i’s profits, associated with marginal variations of three relevant parameters, can
now be made explicit. These concern, respectively, the position of demand (a) and the basic unit costs of
0

0

the two firms ( ci and c j ) :
a) variation of a :

∂qi 1
=
∂a
3
dΠi = 2 qi(1 − de j ) = 2 qi ki(k j − 1) ≥ 0
3
3
da
da
ki k j − 1
0
b) variation of ci :
∂qi
dαi = −2dci0 , dα j = 0 , 0 = − 2
∂ci
3
dΠi = − 2 qi(2 + de j ) = − 2 qi ki(2k j + 1) ≤ 0
3
3
dci0
dci0
ki k j − 1
0
c) variation of c j :
∂qi
dαi = 0 , dα j = −2dc0j , 0 = 1
∂ci
3

dαi = dα j = da ,
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dΠi = 2 qi(1 − de j ) = 2 qi 1 + 2ki + 1  = 2 qi ki(k j + 2) ≥ 0
3
3 
dc0j
dc0j
ki k j − 1  3
kik j − 1
Now, the direction of variation of these three derivatives with respect to xi can now be specified. First, if
we make the simplifying assumption that R&D expenses, ri , are a quadratic function of efficiency, ei . It is
easy to see that in that case, ki and kj are only depend on, and decrease with, respectively, xi and xj .
Since the expression ki /( ki kj –1) is decreasing with ki, it is then an increasing function of xi, and the same
is true for

dΠi , dΠ i , dΠ i .
da dci0 dc0j

When this assumption is released, the analysis becomes much more difficult, since ki and kj depend on xi
also through ei and ej . More precisely, one has:

ki = 9
4
kj = 9
4

∂ 2ri
−2
∂ei2
∂ 2rj
−2
∂e2j

so that, by differentiating, it follows that

3
3
dki = 9 ∂ ri dei + 9 ∂ ri de j
4 ∂ei3 dxi 4 ∂ei2∂xi dxi
dxi
dk j = 9 ∂3rj de j
dxi
4 ∂e3j dxi

Note that it has already been assumed that

dei ≥ 0 and de j ≤ 0 .
dxi
dxi
3
∂ ri
∂3rj
≤
0
and
≤0
∂e3j
∂ei3

Accordingly,

∂3ri
≤0
∂ei2∂xi
if

we

.

make

Furthermore, is is known that
the

new

assumption

that

( which means that R&D expenses do not grow too fast with ei ), it can be

established that ki is still a decreasing function , while kj is an increasing function of xi . If, as previously, ki
/( ki kj –1) is decreasing with ki, the property that

dΠ i , dΠ i and dΠ i
da dci0
dc0j

are increasing with xi still

holds.

C. The Reduction of Traded Costs with Segmented Markets
The foregoing analysis can be transposed by replacing Di and Dj , by D’i and D’j, and by observing that
dD’i = -Ei dG and dD’j = -Ej dG. It then follows that then when G varies :
(ki ki - 1)dei = ( kj Ei – Ej ) d(-G 
(ki ki - 1)dej = ( ki Ej – Ei ) d(-G 

It can be seen from these formulas that when the export cost G decreases, this does not entail necessarily an
increase in the research efforts of both firms. It is possible that only one firm benefits from it. For instance,
if

kj <

βj
βi

, we have dei < 0 and dej > 0 ( for then Ej/Ei < 1, so that ki Ej – Ei > 0 ). In the opposite case,
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where

kj >

βj
βi

, it follows that dei > 0, but the sign of dej is indeterminate, since it depends on the value

of kj . The corresponding variation of firm i’s profit is

dΠi = 2 qi(βi − de j ) = 2 qi βi − ki β j − βi)  = 2 qi ki(βik j − β j) 
3 
kik j − 1
ki k j − 1  3
d(−δ) 3
d(−δ)

We can see that there is now a condition for profit to grow when the export cost G diminishes. This
condition may be written

β j 2bi − bj
=
βi
2bj − bi
When it is met, dΠ i > 0
d(−δ)
kj >

and the analysis proceeds analogously to that in the previous cases. In

particular, under the same conditions as before,

dΠi is an increasing function of xi .
d(−δ)
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Appendix IV
Let qi and qi* represent, respectively, the sales levels of the domestic firm, respectively, in its home
and export markets, then when markets are segmented, the variable cost margin of firm i is:
Mis = (pi – ci ) qi + (pj – ci - G) qi*,
The two firms are understood to compete in quantities upon the two markets, so that at the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, the sales of firm i amount to:
qi = 1/3 [ai –2bi ci +bi (cj + G )]
qi*= 1/3 [aj –2bj (ci + G ) + bj cj]
Accordingly, the variable cost margin of firm i is given by:
Mis = 1/bi qi2 + 1/bj qi*2 = 1/9bi [ai –2bi ci +bi (cj + G )]2 + 1/9bj [aj –2bj (ci + G ) +bj cj]2 .
If the following definition is adopted,
Mis = 1/9bi [ai +bi (G -

i)]

2

i

= 2ci – cj , then it follows that:

+ 1/9bj [aj –bj (2G+

i)

]2 = bi / 9 [ai / bi + G -

i

]2 + bj / 9 [aj / bj - 2G-

i]

2

After the two markets are fully integrated, the global demand function is specified by: Q = a – p , where a
= ai + aj . The new Cournot equilibrium is characterized by qi = 1/3 [a –2 ci + cj ], and the variable cost
margin of firm i is given as:
Mi = 1/ 9 [a –2 ci + cj ] 2= 1/ 9 [a –

i

]2

Redefining terms, such that ai’ = a +G bi –2 G bj , the latter expression can be alternative expressed as:
Mis = 1/ 9 ( bi + bj )
= 1/ 9 [ ai’ –

i

2
i

– 2/ 9 [ ai + aj + G bi – 2 G bj ]

i

+ 1/ 9 [ ai 2 / bi + aj 2 / bj ]

]2 + 1/ 9 [ ai 2 / bi + aj 2 / bj – ai’2]

By comparing Mis and Mi , it can easily be seen that the passage from segmented markets to integration
can be interpreted as an upward move of the demand function, from ai’ to a, since, with our assumptions
about bi and bj , ai’ < a . The other terms also introduce a difference between Mis and Mi . Yet, since they
are independent of the cost structure and, hence, the R&D decisions, they do not impact the progress of
the game.
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